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Geoffrey J. Butler, Esq.
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

re:

Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corp. et al.
Appeal No. 870118

Dear Mr. Butler:
Oral argument in the above referenced appeal is scheduled
for Tuesday afternoon, April 11, 1989. Following the submission
of briefs by appellants and respondent, several cases were
decided by the Utah Supreme Court on the issue of governmental
immunity.
Counsel for respondent Provo City Corporation,
provided the Court with four of the most recent cases in a letter
dated March 17, 1989.
A significant case decided after the submission of the
briefs but not cited by Provo City, is Schultz v. Conger, 755
P.2d 165(Utah 1988).
In Schultz, the plaintiff brought suit
against a deputy sheriff for injuries suffered when the deputy
allegedly struck her vehicle while he was serving subpoenas for
Salt Lake County.
The sheriff's office sought to dismiss the
complaint on the Governmental Immunity Act. The District Court
dismissed plaintiff's case and the plaintiff appealed.
The
Supreme Court held that under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
as it existed at the time of the claim, plaintiff was not
required to comply with the one year notice of claim provision
because in serving subpoenas, the sheriff was performing a nongovernmental function.
The Court noted that in 1987, the
legislature amended §63-30-11 to require the filing of a notice

Geoffrey J. Butler, Esq,
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of claim, whether the function giving rise to the claim was
characterized as governmental or non-governmental.
The Court
noted, however, that the amendment did not apply to the
plaintiff's claim, because the claim arose in 1984, prior to the
date of the 1987 amendment.
The decision in the Schultz case is
relevant to Point III of Appellant's Brief and Point IB2 of
Appellant's Reply Brief.
In addition, the case of Jenkins v. Swann, 675 P.2d (Points
I and II) 1145(Utah 1983), is relevant to the equitable claims of
taking and nuisance raised in appellant's briefs. In Jenkins,
the plaintiff brought suit seeking a judgment concerning the
State educational system and five of the school districts
concerning tax practices of the County and State. The Court held
that the suit was not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act
because the plaintiff was seeking equitable relief in the form of
a declaratory judgment.
The Supreme Court cited El Rancho
Enterprises, in which they had held that the common law exception
to governmental immunity pertaining to equitable claims has long
been recognized in this jurisdiction. The Court went on to say
that neither the passage of time nor the enactment of the
Governmental Immunity Act has eroded that principle. In 1978,
the statutory section authorizing the suit in El Rancho (Utah
Code Ann. , 1953 §10-7-77) was repealed and "such claims are now
covered exclusively by the Governmental Immunity Act. See, Laws
of Utah, 1978, Chapter 27, §12.
These amendments do not
undermine the continued liability of a holding in the El Rancho
that equitable claims of this nature for assessments made without
authority of law are exempt from the notice requirements.
Because this holding is predicated on the common law exception to
governmental immunity for equitable claims, such claims are also
exempt from the undertaking requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act."
The court further held that the notice
requirement of the Governmental Immunity Act did not apply in
this case. Jenkins, at 1154.
The aforementioned cases are submitted pursuant to Rule
24 (J) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and copies of the
cases are enclosed.
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Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated
Si*fce#ely,

i
Crai$ W. Anderson
^ f or VAN WAGONER &

CWA:pm
cc: Gary L. Gregerson
Attorney for Respondent
50 South 3 00 West
P.O. Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603-1849
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Inc., 674 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1982); McEnroe
v. Morgan, 106 Idaho 326, 678 P.2d 595
(App.1984); Illingworth v. Bushong, 61 Or.
App. 152, 656 P.2d 370 (1982), affd, 297 Or.
675, 688 R2d 379 (1984).
[5] Harmon did not assert or prove that
liquidated damages were unreasonably disproportionate to compensatory damages.
Nor was there anything in the contract
providing for how the liquidated damages
would be computed that indicated that the
formula would provide an unreasonable result In fact, the evidence at trial was that
if the contract had been performed as
agreed, YESCO would have realized a total
of $8,340 and, under the benefit-of-the-bargain rule, could have recovered the full
contract price, less the current value of the
sign and the time value of the payments.
The contractual remedy of 75 percent of
the remaining payment balance, which in
this case was $5,446,63, is not disproportionate to the damages actually sustained.
Indeed, this Court recognized the validity
of this very liquidated damages provision in
Young Electric Sign Co. v. Vetas, 564 P.2d
758 (Utah 1977).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court erred in requiring plaintiff to prove
actual damages and hold that the liquidated damages provision should have been
applied.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for entry
of judgment in favor of YESCO for damages as provided by the liquidated damages
provision of the contract and for attorney
fees as provided therein.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J.,
DURHAM, J., and BENCH, J., Court
of Appeals concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., having disqualified
himself, does not participate herein;
BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.

| MY KUMMK SYSTEM/

Le Ann R. SCHULTZ, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Weldon CONGER, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 860181.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 3, 1988.

Plaintiff brought suit against deputy
sheriff for injuries she suffered when deputy sheriff allegedly struck her vehicle while
serving subpoenas for Salt Lake County.
Deputy sheriff moved to dismiss complaint
on ground that plaintiff had not complied
with Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Leonard H. Russon, J., dismissed plaintiffs
case, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme
Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held that under Utah Governmental Immunity Act, as
it existed at time claim arose, plaintiff was
not required to comply with one-year notice
of claim provisions inasmuch as, in serving
subpoenas, deputy sheriff was performing
nongovernmental function.
Order vacated, remanded.

Counties <£*213
Under one-year notice of claim provisions contained in Utah Governmental Immunity Act existing at time deputy sheriff
allegedly hit plaintiffs vehicle while serving subpoenas during course of his employment with Salt Lake County, plaintiff was
not required to give notice of claim inasmuch as service of process was not essential government function which only
government could perform. U.C.A.1953,
63-30-1 to 63-30-38.

John S. Snow, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant
Louis E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
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HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Le Ann R. Schultz appeals from
an order dismissing her complaint for failure to comply with the notice provisions of
the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and -13 (1986).
Plaintiff commenced this action against
defendant Weldon Conger to recover damages for her personal injuries. She alleged
that while Conger was operating a motor
vehicle for Salt Lake County, he negligently struck the rear of her vehicle, which was
stopped at an intersection. Salt Lake
County has not been made a party to this
action. Defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that plaintiff had
not complied with Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-13 (1986), which provides that a
claim against a political subdivision or
against its employee for an act occurring
during the performance of his duties is
barred unless notice of the claim is filed
with the governing body of the political
subdivision within one year after the claim
arises. Plaintiff did not file a claim in
accordance with this section.
However, in support of his motion to
dismiss, defendant submitted an affidavit
stating that at the time of the accident, he
was serving subpoenas in the course of his
employment as a deputy sheriff of Salt
Lake County. This activity is clearly nongovernmental since rule 14(c) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure and rules 45(c)
and 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that subpoenas in both criminal and civil cases may be served by any
adult person. We held in Standiford v.
Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980),
that the Governmental Immunity Act, sections 63-30-1 through -38, afforded immunity to the state, its political subdivisions,
and its employees only when the employee
is engaged in an essential governmental
function, which we defined as a function
which only government can perform. We
later held that the notice requirements of
the Governmental Immunity Act contained
in section 63-30-13 applied only to claims
arising from the performance of a true
governmental function and not to nongovernmental functions. Cox v. Utah Mort-

gage & Loan, 716 P.2d 783 (Utah 1986);
Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary
District, 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984).
Since plaintiff is suing an employee of a
political subdivision who was engaged in a
nongovernmental activity, she was not required to comply with the one-year notice
requirements of section 63-30-13 and her
complaint should not have been dismissed
because of her failure to do so. It should
be noted that in 1987 the legislature
amended section 63-30-11 to require the
filing of a notice of a claim whether the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental or nongovernmental. That amendment, however, does
not apply to the instant case where the
claim arose in 1984.
The order is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART,
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.

Jay REKWARD, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Howard Foley Company, Travelers Insurance Company and Second Injury
Fund, Defendants.
No. 870371-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 19, 1988.
Worker sought review of order of Industrial Commission finding permanent
partial impairment rating of 23%, ten percent due to cervical injury, and discontinuing temporary total disability benefits.
The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that
(1) medical panel's permanent partial impairment rating was neither arbitrary nor
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Lynn A. JENKINS, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
Karl G. SWAN, et at, Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 17566.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 10, 1983.
Plaintiff brought suit seeking judgment concerning aspects of educational
system of the state and five of its school
districts, and concerning taxing practices of
county and state. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, James S. Saways,
J., dismissed complaint, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J.,
held that: (1) plaintiff lacked standing to
challenge constitutionality of educators
serving in State Legislature; (2) plaintiff
lacked standing to present his claim that
statute providing that members of boards
of education shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if those persons refuse or neglect
"to enforce the use of text books adopted
by the [Utah State Textbook] commission
* * * " was unconstitutional; (3) plaintiff
lacked standing to present his claim that
statute providing that use of textbooks
adopted by State Textbook Commission
"shall be mandatory in all districts and
high schools of the state" was unconstitutional; (4) plaintiff had standing to demand
refund of his 1980 property tax; (5) plaintiff had standing to raise his claim concerning unconstitutional expenditure of public
moneys on tax-exempt private property
held by religious organizations; and (6)
plaintiff was not required to comply with
notice and undertaking requirements of
Governmental Immunity Act.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded.
Wahlquist, D J., concurred and dissented by separate opinion.
Stewart, J., dissented.
61 5?26—26

1. Injunction <s=»114(2)
Party moving for injunctive relief must
have standing to invoke jurisdiction of the
Court
2. Declaratory Judgment <s=»292
Party seeking declaratory judgment
must have standing to invoke jurisdiction
of the Court.
3. Declaratory Judgment <£=*1, 272
Statutory creation of relief in form of
declaratory judgment does not create cause
of action or grant jurisdiction to court
where it would not otherwise exist; declaratory judgment statute merely authorizes
new form of relief, which in some cases
will provide fuller and more adequate remedy than that which existed under common
law.
4. Action <s=>13
Plaintiff must be able to show that he
has suffered some distinct and palpable
injury that gives him personal stake in
outcome of legal dispute.
5. Action <£*13
It is generally insufficient for plaintiff
to assert only general interest he shares in
common with members of public at large.
6. Appeal and Error <s=>19
Supreme Court will not entertain generalized grievances that are more appropriately directed to legislative and executive
branches of state government.
7. Action <®=13
Despite Supreme Court's power to
"grant standing where matters of great
public interest and societal impact are concerned," the Court will not readily relieve
plaintiff of salutory requirement of showing real and personal interest in dispute.
8. Action <e=*13
Plaintiff will have standing to sue if he
is adversely affected by government actions and there is some causal relationship
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between the injury to the plaintiff, the governmental actions and the relief requested;
if plaintiff does not have standing under
this criterion, court will grant standing if
there is no one who has greater interest in
outcome of case than plaintiff, if issue is
unlikely to be raised at all if plaintiff is
denied standing and if issues are of sufficient weight and they are not more properly addressed by other branches of government.
9. Constitutional Law <s=>42.3(2)
Plaintiff lacked standing, as taxpayer
and citizen, to challenge constitutionality of
educators serving in State Legislature,
where plaintiff made no claim of specific
injury which was causally related to alleged illegal activity and plaintiff was not
resident of districts which employed educators/legislators named as defendants.
10. Constitutional Law e=>42.1(3)
Plaintiff lacked standing to present his
claim that statute providing that members
of boards of education shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor if those persons refuse or
neglect "to enforce the use of text books
adopted by the [Utah State Textbook] commission * * *" was unconstitutional,
where plaintiff did not allege that he was
member of local board of education and
therefore could not contend that he was or
was likely to be subject to prosectuion under this Code section.
U.C.A.1953,
53-13-10.
11. Constitutional Law «=*42.1(1)
Plaintiff lacked standing to present his
claim that statute providing that use of
textbooks adopted by State Textbook Commission "shall be mandatory in all districts
and high schools of the state" was unconstitutional, absent allegation that the mandate adversely affected him or his children,
except insofar as it may have inflicted
some kind of "spiritual" discomfort caused
by existence of statute he believed was
unconstitutional. U.C.A.1953, 53-13-2.
12. Officers and Public Employees <£=>119
Statute declaring it a misdemeanor for
a "public officer or public employee [to]
knowingly and intentionally" violate stat-

ute did not provide plaintiff with standing
to act as private attorney general in enforcement of statute. U.C.A.1953, 67-1612.
13. States <s=168V2
Plaintiff lacked standing to request
that State Education Association be restrained from providing gifts, loans and
other financial support to "educator-legislators," since appropriate parties to initiate
any action concerning violations of governing statute were in executive and legislative branches. U.C.A.1953, 67-16-10.
14. Taxation <s=>537
Plaintiff had standing to demand refund of his 1980 property taxes based on
his allegation of unconstitutionality of statute pursuant to which all or part of those
taxes were assessed.
15. Constitutional Law <2=>42.1(7f
Plaintiffs allegations that because of
limited amount of property available for
taxation and unconstitutional expenditure
of tax dollars on religious institutions
which had large property holdings but paid
no property taxes he was required to pay
increased taxes as owner of taxable private
property gave him standing to raise his
claim concerning unconstitutional expenditure of public moneys on taxes on private
property held by religious organizations.
U.C.A.1953, 59-11-11.
16. Taxation <s=>543(2)
Plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment
and return of his property tax was not
required to comply with notice and undertaking requirements of Governmental Immunity Act U.C.A.1953, 59-11-11, 63-3011.
17. Attorney General <3=>6
Even if tax commission had duty to
maintain records concerning private property which was exempt from taxation, it was
responsibility of Attorney General to prosecute officers who had neglected to maintain
records.
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Thomas S. Taylor, Provo, for plaintiff
and appellant
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake"
City, William Evans, Asst Atty. Gen., Ted
Cannon, Salt Lake County Atty., Bill Thomas Peters, Deputy S.L. Co. Atty., Felshaw
King, Clearfield, David L. Church and Michael T. McCoy, Bruce Findlay, Salt Lake
City, Ron Elton, Tooele, for defendants and
respondents.
DURHAM, Justice:
Plaintiff/appellant, Lynn A. Jenkins (Jenkins), has filed this multi-party and multifaceted lawsuit which defies a simple and
concise explanation. In a one division complaint directed to all defendants, Jenkins
seeks a judgment concerning certain aspects of the educational system of the state
of Utah and five of its school districts, and
concerning the taxing practices of Salt
^Lake County and the state of Utah. Apparently none of the defendants considered
it necessary to exercise their rights under
Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to an ambiguous complaint. All the
defendants, rather, proceeded under Rule
12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
to ask that the entire complaint be dismissed for, inter alia, a lack of jurisdiction
because Jenkins lacked standing to press
these claims, failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, failure to comply with thefUtah governmental immunity
statute, U.OA., 1953, § 63-30-1 to - 3 8 /
(1978 and Supp.1981 and Interim Supp.
1983), and the previous adjudication of the
issues in similar suits filed by Jenkins.1 In
response to these motions, the district
court dismissed Jenkins' complaint "as to
all of the defendants" because: (1) Jenkins
lacked standing, (2) Jenkins failed to com\
ply with notice and undertaking require-j
rnents of the governmental immunity acty
and (3) the matter was res judicata as
"most issues" have already been decided
by the Utah Supreme Court. On appeal,
Jenkins asks that the district court's order
of dismissal be reversed.
1. Jenkins v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289 (1980);

The first set of defendants which can be
identified in Jenkins' complaint are those
related to the Utah educational system.
These individual defendants can be
matched with their respective school systems as follows: defendant Swan is a
teacher for the Tooele School District; defendants Curan and Burningham are teachers for the Davis School District; defendant Bishop is a teacher and defendant AlforJ
is a principal for the Ogden School District;
and defendant LeFevere is Director of Personnel for the Weber School District. The
Jordan School District, the State of Utah,
Superintendent of Public Instruction Walter D. Talbot, and the Utah Educational
Association are also defendants. Jenkins*
complaint prays for judgment as follows:
1. A declaration that the local School
Districts and the Utah Department of
Public Instruction are prohibited from
hiring Utah legislators during the term
of their office or continuing such legislators as empnlyees once they become
members of legislature. Article V, Section 1 and Article VI, § 6 of the Utah
State Constitution, state, respectively, (a)
"no person charged with the exercise of
the powers properly belonging to one of
these departments [of the Utah government], shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others," and
(b) that "[n]o person holding any public
office of profit or trust under authority
. . . of this State, shall be a member of
the legislature."
2. A declaration that the educator-legislators named as individual defendants
are in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-16 (1953) for failing to file a conflict
of interest disclosure statement concerning monies allegedly received from the
Utah Education Association during the
time when the legislature is in session.
3. A permanent restraining order prohibiting the Utah Educational Association from paying, hiring, loaning or gifting educators-legislators during the term
of their office as legislators.
Jenkins v. State, Utah, 585 P.2d 442 (1978).
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4. A declaration that the "Utah State
Textbook Commission" and the mandatory use of textbook provisions of Utah
law, § 53-13-2 and 53-13-10, U.C.A.,
1953, is unconstitutional, since it is in
violation of Article X, § 9 of the Utah
State Constitution, which states: "Neither the Legislature nor the State Board
of Education shall have power to prescribe textbooks to be used in the common schools."
The second category of issues addressed
in Jenkins' complaint relates to taxation
and certain expenditures of public funds.
It appears that Jenkins' demand for relief
is directed to the Salt Lake County Attorney, the Salt Lake County Commission, the
Salt Lake County Treasurer, the State of
Utah, the Utah Attorney General and the
Utah Tax Commission. Jenkins filed a protest with his 1980 property taxes, which
were paid in the amount of $807.89. He
prays for the following relief:
1. A refund of his 1980 property tax.
2. An order to Salt Lake County to prepare, publish and update a list of all
exempt taxable property, itemized by
owner valuation and amount of tax forgiven;
3. A declaratory judgment that the
funding of the Uniform State Public Education System by local property tax is
unconstitutional as not providing for
equal distribution of tax throughout the
state and being a denial of equal protection.
4. A declaratory judgment that providing public property and public services to
religious organizations which are exempt
from the payment of property tax is in
violation of Article 1, § 4 of the Utah
State Constitution, which states: "The
State shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion" and "[n]o public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction or for the
support of any ecclesiastical establishment"

I.
[1-3] We consider first the question of
whether Jenkins had standing to raise
those issues concerning the service in the
Utah Legislature of Utah educators. The
threshold requirement that Jenkins have
standing is equally applicable whether he
seeks declaratory or injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is a traditional equitable
remedy in the appropriate cases, but as
with other common law remedies, the moving party must have standing to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court. The same jurisdictional standard applies to declaratory
judgments. The statutory creation of relief in the form of a declaratory judgment
does not create a cause of action or grant
jurisdiction to the court where it would not
otherwise exist. The Utah Declaratory
Judgment Statute merely authorizes a new
form of relief, which in some cases will
provide a fuller and more adequate remedy
than that which existed under the common
law. Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P.2d
251 (1943).
[4-6] We have previously held that four
requirements must be satisfied before the
district court can proceed in an action for
declaratory judgment: "(1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of
the parties must be adverse; (3) the parties
seeking relief must have a legally protectiv e interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issues between the parties must be ripe for
judicial determination." Jenkins v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289 (1980) (citing Baird
v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978)). See
also Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City
Corp., Utah, 531 P.2d 866 (1975); Lyon v.
Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 818
(1951). Requirements (2) and (3) represent
the traditional test for standing. Plaintiff
must be able to show that he has suffered
some distinct and palpable injury that gives
him a personal stake in the outcome of the
legal dispute. See Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343
(1975); Stromquist v. Cokayne, Utah, 646
P.2d 746 (1982); Sears v. Ogden City
Utah, 572 P.2d 1359 (1977); Main Parking
Mall. It is generally insufficient for a
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plaintiff to assert only a general interest he emerged as a governmental institution disshares in common with members of the tinct from the executive. The identification
public at large. See Stromquist; Baird v. of the judiciary as one of three separate
State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978). We will and equal branches of government in our
not entertain generalized grievances that written state Constitution must be viewed
are more appropriately directed to the leg- in light of this historical development
islative and executive branches of the state
Inherent in the tripartite allocation of
government.
governmental powers is the historical and
f Unlike the federal system, the judicial pragmatic conviction that particular dispower of the state of Utah is not constitu- putes are most amenable to resolution in
tionally restricted by the language of Arti- particular forums. /The requirement that a
cle HI of the United States Constitution plaintiff have a personal stake in the outrequiring "cases" and "controversies," come of a dispute is intended to confine the
since no similar requirement exists in the courts to a role consistent with the separaUtah Constitution. We previously have tion of powers, and to limit the jurisdiction
held that "this Court may grant standing of the courts to those disputes which are
where matters of great public interest and most efficiently and effectively resolved
societal impact are concerned." Jenkins v. through the judicial process. See Flast v.
State, Utah, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (1978) (foot- Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20/
note omitted). However, the requirement L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). The courts are most
that the plaintiff have a personal stake in competent in the exercise of their function
the outcome of a legal dispute is rooted in when they have a "concrete factual context
the historical and constitutional role of the conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
judiciary in Utah.
consequences of judicial .action." Valley
Historically, the courts were an exten- Forge Christian College v. Americans
sion of the executive branch and were de- United for Separation of Church and
veloped to resolve disputes between private State, 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct 752, 758, 70
parties, and between the government as a L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). A plaintiff with a diland owner and private parties concerning rect and personal stake in the outcome of a
the use and ownership of land. With the dispute will aid the court in its deliberaadvent of mercantilism, industrialization tions by fully developing all the material
and urbanization, the courts became in- factual and legal issues in an effort to
creasingly concerned with disputes over convince the court that the relief requested
the regulation of economic activity by pri- will redress the claimed injury.
vate contract, and injuries to individuals in
Constitutionally, the courts have the dual
their daily activities in a crowded and comobligation
to apply statutory and common
plex society. "[T]he liability of one individlaw
principles
to a particular dispute and to
ual to another under the law . . . is a matevaluate
those
principles against governing
ter of private rights . . . Private-rights disconstitutional
standards.
The propriety of
putes . . . lie at the core of the historically
recognized judicial power."
Northern such action by the federal courts has been
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon recognized since Marbury v. Madison, 5
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct 2858, U.S. 137 (1 Cranch 137) 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803),
2870-71, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (citations and this Court has recognized that it is the
omitted). The courts developed ways of inherent role of the judiciary to interpret
identifying and categorizing particular constitutional provisions. See Matheson v.
grievances, techniques for the receipt of Ferry, 641 P.2d 674 (1982); Jenkins v.
information, and principles for arriving at a State. In the proper discharge of their
resolution of these disputes. See general- duty in this regard, the courts must necesly T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the sarily defer on some issues to the other
Common Law (5th ed. 1956). In the branches of state government. For examcourse of this development, the judiciary ple, the airing of generalized grievances
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and the vindication of public rights are actions has standing under this criterion.
properly addressed to the legislature, a fo- One who is not adversely affected has no
rum where freewheeling debate on broad standing. A mere allegation of an adverse
issues of public policy is in order.
impact is not sufficient There must also
To grant standing to a litigant, who be some causal relationship alleged becannot distinguish himself from all citi- tween the injury to the plaintiff, the govzens, would be a significant inroad on the ernmental actions and the relief requested.
representative form of government, and Because standing questions are usually
cast the courts in the role of supervising raised prior to the introduction of any evithe coordinate branches of government. dence, we will necessarily be required to
It would convert the, judiciary into an make a judgment whether proof of such a
open forum for the resolution of political causal relationship is difficult or impossible
and ideological disputes about the per- and whether the relief requested is substantially likely to redress the injury
formance of government.
Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 717 claimed. K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise § 22.20 at 368-70 (1982 Supp.). If
(1978).
the
plaintiff satisfies this requirement, he
An overstepping of appropriate rewill
be granted standing and no further
straints on judicial review of such political
inquiry
is required.
and ideological disputes is not only consti
tutionally and historically inappropriate, @ If the plaintiff does not have standing
but also unwise. Although the Utah judici- under the first step, we will then address
ary is not life-tenured, the following obser- the question of whether there is anyone
who has a greater interest in the outcome
vation is applicable:
[RJepeated and essentially head-on con- of the case than the plaintiff. If there is
frontations between the life-tenured no one, and if the issue is unlikely to be
branch and representative branches of raised at all if the plaintiff is denied standgovernment will not, in the long run, be ing, this Court will grant standing. See,
beneficial to either. The public confi- e.g., State v. Lewis, Alaska, 559 P.2d 630,
dence essential to the former and the 635 (1977). When standing is predicated on
vitality critical to the latter may well the assertion that the issues involve "great
erode if we do not exercise self-restraint public interest and societal impact," we will
in the utilization of our power to nega- retain our practical concern that the parties
tive the actions of the other branches. involved have the interest necessary to efUnited States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, fectively assist the court in developing and
188, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 2952, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 reviewing all relevant legal and factual"
questions. (The Court will deny standing
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
when a plaintiff does not satisfy the first
[7, 8] Therefore, despite our recognition
requirement of the analysis and there are
of this Court's power to "grant standing
potential plaintiffs with a more direct interwhere matters of great public interest and
est in the issues who can more adequately
societal impact are concerned," this Court
litigate the issues^
will not readily relieve a plaintiff of the
The third step in the analysis is to decide
salutory requirement of showing a real and
if
the issues raised by the plaintiff are of
personal interest in the dispute. In light of
the historical, constitutional and practical sufficient public importance in and of themconsiderations discussed above, we engage selves to grant him standing. The absence
in a three-step inquiry in reviewing the of a more appropriate plaintiff will not
question of a plaintiffs standing to sue. automatically justify granting standing to
The first step in the inquiry will be directed a particular plaintiff. This Court must still
to the traditional criteria of the plaintiffs determine, on a case-by-case basis, that the
personal stake in the controversy. One issues are of sufficient weight, see Jenkins
who is adversely affected by governmental v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289 (1980),
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and that they are not more properly addressed by the other branches of government Constitutional and practical considerations will necessarily affect our decisions in cases where a plaintiff who lacks
standing under step one nevertheless raises
important public issues. These are matters
to be more fully developed in the context of
future cases.
[9] In this case, Jenkins claims that he
is bringing this complaint as a resident of
the state of Utah and as a "citizen, taxpayer, registered voter and parent" who is a
member of a class of persons with a joint
or common right against the 'defendants.
Jenkins is a resident of Salt Lake County
and has paid taxes to that entity. Jenkins
is not a resident of the Tooele, Davis, Ogden or Weber School Districts, the districts
which employ the educators/legislators
named as defendants in this action. Jenkins fails to make any allegations that he is
a resident of the legislative districts from
which these individuals were elected. His
claimed personal stake in the issue of educators serving as legislators is that they
vote on legislation which financially benefits them as employees of the education
system and that this adversely affects Jenkins as a taxpayer.
Jenkins* mere reliance on his general status as a taxpayer and citizen does nothing
to distinguish him from any member of the
public at large with regard to this dispute.
His challenge is extremely broad; he attacks the constitutionality of educators
serving in the Utah legislature, but makes
no claim of a particularized injury to himself by virtue of the claimed wrong. Absent some claim of specific injury which is
causally related to the alleged illegal activity, Jenkins has not met the traditional
standing test articulated in step one above.
Jenkins further requests that we grant
him standing under the rationale that he
raises questions of great public interest
and societal impact. We need not address
that issue. Since Jenkins' claim for standing on this issue is predicated solely on the
grounds of its public importance, we will
not grant him standing when the pleadings

reveal other potential plaintiffs with a
more direct interest in this particular question. Jenkins' interest as a resident of the
state of Utah is certainly less direct than
the interest of the residents of the school
districts which employ these individuals or
the legislative districts from which they
were elected. We need not and do not
decide here whether residents of those areas would have standing to bring this complaint. We do find, however, that Jenkins'
interest is less direct than the interest of
those living in the relevant school districts
or legislative districts. Therefore, we will
not invoke the standing doctrine of "great
public interest and societal impact" to consider his request for standing.
[10,11] We also hold that Jenkins lacks
standing to present his claims that U.C.A.,
1953, §§ 53-13-2 and 53-13-10 are unconstitutional. Section 53-13-10 provides that
members of boards of education shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor if those persons
refuse or neglect "to enforce the use of
textbooks adopted by the [Utah State Textbook] commission
" Jenkins does not
allege that he is a member of a local board
of education and therefore cannot contend
that he is or is likely to be subject to
prosecution under this code section. In the
absence of any such personal adverse impact, Jenkins lacks standing to raise the
issue of the constitutionality of the statute.
See Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake City Commission, Utah, 624 P.2d 1138 (1981); Cavaness v. Cox, Utah, 598 P.2d 349 (1979).
Section 53-13-2 states that use of the textbooks adopted by the state textbook commission "shall be mandatory in all districts
and high schools of the state." Jenkins
fails to allege that this mandate adversely
affects him or his children, except insofar
as it may inflict some kind of "spiritual"
discomfort caused by the existence of a
statute he believes is unconstitutional.
This Court may not issue an advisory opinion on this question merely to relieve his
discomfort. See Redwood Gym and Baird.
Further, members of local boards of education constitute a class of potential plaintiffs
with a more direct interest in this question
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than Jenkins, and, therefore, we will not
address the question of whether Jenkins
should be granted standing because of the
alleged public importance of the issues involved.
[12] Jenkins also requests that this
Court enter an order directing the "educator-legislators" to file a conflict of interest
disclosure statement concerning money allegedly received from the Utah Education
Association. U.C.A., 1953, § 67-16-12 declares it a misdemeanor for a "public officer or public employee [to] knowingly and
intentionally" violate the statute. The statute does not provide Jenkins with standing
to act as a private attorney general in the
enforcement of this statute. This Court
will not presume to order these defendants
to do that which they are already required
to do by statute, if in fact the statute even
applies to legislators.
[13] Jenkins further requests this
Court to permanently restrain the Utah
Education Association from providing gifts,
loans and other financial support to "educator-legislators." U.C.A., 1953, § 67-16-10
states that "[n]o person shall induce or
seek to induce any public officer or public
employee to violate any of the provisions of
this act" The appropriate parties to initiate any action concerning violations of this
statute are in the executive and legislative
branches. Jenkins* position in this situation is identical to that of the citizenry at
large, and therefore he lacks standing to
pursue this cause of action.
II.
In the introductory portion of this opinion, we outlined the relief sought by Jenkins in connection with payment of his 1980
property taxes. Apparently these claims,
as well as those discussed above, were dismissed by the district court on the basis
that Jenkins lacked standing, that he failed
to comply with the procedural requirements of the statutes on governmental immunity, and that the doctrine of res judicata applied. Unlike the issues concerning
educators in the legislature, none of the
questions concerning taxation and expendi-

tures raised by Jenkins appear to have
been previously addressed to the district
court or to this Court Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply. Thus,
we must review the district court's dismissal on the issues of standing and the applicability of the Governmental Immunity Act
A.
Jenkins alleges that he paid $807.89 for
property taxes in 1980. A copy of a Salt
Lake County tax assessment form in that
amount is appended to his petition along
with a letter addressed to the Salt Lake
County Treasurer. This letter advised that
Jenkins' taxes had be6n paid by Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan and that the payment of the tax was under protest. The
letter is dated November 29, 1980, the date
noted on the tax assessment forms as the
deadline for payment of the 1980 property
taxes. U.C.A., 1953, § 59-11-11 (Supp.
1981) provides that when a party deems a
levy to be unlawful, "such party may pay
under protest such tax .. . a n d thereupon
the party so paying or his legal representative may bring an action in the tax division
of the appropriate district court against the
officer to whom said tax or license was
paid, or against the state, county, municipality or other taxing unit on whose behalf
the same was collected, to recover said tax
. . . paid under protest." No particular
form of protest is required, Murdoch v.
Murdoch, 38 Utah 373, 113 P. 330 (1911),
and in the absence of the creation of a tax
court in the district in which the action is
filed, the bringing of an action in the appropriate district court is deemed as being in
compliance with § 59-11-11. See U.C.A.,
1953, §§ 59-24-1 to -9 (Supp.1981 and Interim Supp.1983). For purposes of our review, we assume Jenkins' allegations that
he paid his 1980 property taxes and filed
the letter of protest appended to his petition are true.
[14] The constitutionality or legality of
a tax statute may be raised in an action
that is properly filed pursuant to § 59-11-1
in the district court. See State Tax Com-
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mission v. Wright, Utah, 596 P.2d 634
(1979). Therefore, Jenkins clearly has
standing to demand a refund of his 1980
property tax based on his claim that the tax
statute pursuant to which all or part of
that tax was assessed is unconstitutional.
Jenkins1 specific claim is that the system of
uniform funding of state public education
by local property taxes is unconstitutional.
We hold that Jenkins has standing to demand a refund of all or part of his 1980
property taxes based on his allegation of
the unconstitutionality of this statutory
scheme.

gal purposes." Id. at 441, 228 P.2d at 821.
In arriving at this conclusion, we quoted
with approval the following language of
the Illinois Supreme Court
We have repeatedly held that taxpayers
may resort to a court of equity to prevent the misapplication of public funds,
and that this right is based upon the
taxpayers' equitable ownership of such
funds and their liability to replenish the
public treasury for the deficiency which
would be caused by the misappropriation.
Id. at 443, 228 P.2d at 823 (quoting Fergus
v. Russel, 270 111. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915)).

Jenkins also requests this Court to declare the providing of public property and
public services to religious organizations,
which are exempt by law from the payment
of property taxes, unconstitutional under
Art. 1, Sec. 4 of the Utah Constitution.
This Court has long held that a taxpayer
has standing to prosecute an action against
municipalities and other political subdivisions of the state for illegal expenditures.
In an early case involving expenditures for
the construction of a water distribution
system, we said:
To* the extent that the water rates are
excessive his taxes are increased, and the
mere fact that it increases in like proportion the taxes of all other taxpayers does
not deprive him of the right to maintain
an action to arrest the waste of public
funds.
Brummitt v. Ogden Waterworks Co., 33
Utah 289, 295-96, 93 P. 828, 831 (1908).
See also Tooele Building Association v.
Tooele High School District, 43 Utah 362,
134 P. 894 (1913).

[151 In applying the foregoing authorities to this case, we note that Jenkins
makes allegations concerning the limited
amount of private property in the state of
Utah subject to state taxation. He further
alleges that because of the limited amount
of property available for taxation and the
unconstitutional expenditure of tax dollars
on religious institutions which have large
property holdings but pay no property tax,
he must pay increased taxes as an owner of
taxable private property. He has alleged
that he is directly and adversely affected
by this governmental action. We hold that
these allegations give him standing under
the test set out in Section I of this opinion.
In arriving at this conclusion, we need not
determine the extent of the adverse impact
on Jenkins; we only conclude that he has
alleged a direct adverse impact which may
be subject to proof, and it is likely that if
the governmental action is declared unconstitutional, the adverse impact on Jenkins
will be relieved. We hold, therefore, that
Jenkins has standing to raise his claim concerning the unconstitutional expenditure of
public monies on tax exempt private property held by religious organizations as part
of his claim filed under U.C.A., 1953,
§ 59-11-11 (Supp.1981).

We have also extended the taxpayer's
right to sue concerning illegal use of public
monies to include an action against the
state. In Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434,
228 P.2d 818 (1951), we reviewed the various arguments for and against the grant of
B.
such a taxpayer right of action and concluded that it should be permitted in this
The motions of the defendants to dismiss
state. "[A] taxpayer should be permitted Jenkins' entire complaint were granted on
to enjoin the unlawful expenditure of tax the basis that he failed to comply with the
moneys in which he has a pecuniary inter- Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See
est, or to prevent increased levies for ille- C U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-1 to -38 (1978 &
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Supp.1981 & Interim Supp.1983). We need
only address this issue in connection with
Jenkins' claim for the return of his property tax under § 59-11-11 as those are the
only causes of action concerning which we
have found Jenkins to have standing.
[16] The district court found that Jenkins had failed to comply with the notice
and undertaking requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act Section 63-30v i l of that Act now provides that
[A]ny person having a claim for injury
against a governmental entity or against
an employee shall before maintaining an
action for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties,
within the scope of employment, or under
color of authority, shall file a written
notice of claim with such entity.
^The word "injury" is defined in § 63-302(6) as "death, injury to a person, damage
to or loss of property, or any other injury
that a person may suffer to his person, or
estate, that would be actionable if inflicted
by a private person or his agent" This
definition of "injury" underscores the real
concern of the governmental immunity act,
namely that "a governmental entity, like
individuals and private entities, should be
liable for an injury inflicted by it" Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., Utah, 605
P.2d 1230, 1234 (1980). See also Thomas v.
Clearfield City, Utah, 642 P.2d 737 (1982).
\AJenkins' claim for an adjustment on his
property taxes is neither an "injury" as
defined in § 63-30-2(6) nor is it an "action
under this act" Jenkins is prosecuting
this action under a separate statutory authorization, § 59-11-11, which predates the
enactment of the Governmental Immunity
Act and which provides a distinct and separate basis for his claim against the government The cause of action authorized under § 59-11-11 has its own notice provision
in the form of the requirement to pay the
tax under protest and has its own statute
of limitation. See U.C.A., 1953, § 78-1231. It is not governed by the notice or
undertaking requirements in the Governmental Immunity Act.

Jenkins seeks equitable relief in the form
of a declaratory judgment, in addition to a
return of the property tax paid under protest In El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v.
Murray City Corp., Utah, 565 P.2d 778,
779 (1977), we said that the "common law
exception to governmental immunity per?
taining to equitable claims has long been
recognized in this jurisdiction." We held
that neither the passage of time nor the
enactment of the Governmental Immunity
Act has eroded that principle. Id. at 780.
In 1978, the statutory section authorizing
the suit in El Rancho, see U.C.A., 1953,
§ 10-7-77, was repealed and such claims
are now covered exclusively by the Governmental Immunity Act See Laws of Utah,
1978 ch. 27 § 12. These amendments do
not undermine the continued viability of
our holding in El Rancho that equitable
claims of this nature for assessments made
"without authority of law," are exempt!
from the notice requirements. El RanchoJ
at 780j r Because this holding is predicated
Jon tfie common law exception to governA
[mental immunity for equitable claims, such!
claims are also exempt from the undertaking requirements of the Governmental Im-i
\munity Act.
'
[17] We also note that Jenkins has requested this Court to order the Salt Lake
County Tax Commission to create and
maintain certain records concerning private
property which is exempt from taxation.
U.C.A.1953, § 59-11-2 provides that "[i]f
on examination it is found that any officer
. . . has neglected or refused to perform
any duty relating to revenue, the attorney
general must prosecute the delinquent"
Jenkins has failed to allege any statute or
rule which imposes upon the tax commission a duty to maintain the records in the
manner he requests. Even if there were
such a duty, it is the responsibility of the
attorney general to prosecute officers who
have neglected to maintain records. Jenkins may of course seek any information
which is relevant to his property tax claims
through normal discovery procedures.
Any disputes concerning the availability
and relevancy of this information or the
inconvenience of producing it in a specific
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form would be appropriately addressed to
the district court pursuant to its power to
control discovery.
III.
As we noted at the outset, the complaint
in this case is complicated and confusing.
Plaintiff has not clearly identified the specific parties to whom his allegations are
directed. It is unfortunate that the defendants did not request a clarification of the
complaint prior to proceeding with the motion to dismiss. We have attempted to
organize the issues presented on appeal in
order to address them. The district court's
order of dismissal is reversed insofar as it
dismissed the causes of action discussed in
part II of this opinion, and affirmed in all
other respects. This case is remanded to
the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, J., concur.
WAHLQUIST, District Judge concurring
and dissenting:
I dissent in part. I concur in the majority opinion except in the particular referred
to below.
I have read the plaintiff/appellant's
pleading and brief and have heard his argument The plaintiff is not a member of the
bar. He appears pro se. He evidences
considerable academic training and intellectual control, but does not perform in accordance with the customs of the bar. He
should not be rewarded with undue tolerance at the expense of the defendants for
appearing pro se, nor should his communications be rejected because they are not
ordinary in the court setting. What he is
alleging in layman's terms is surprising,
shocking and seems unbelievable; yet, he
makes his allegations in sober seriousness.
His allegations, as I understand he intends them, are: there is an operating,
grand conspiracy executed by a large segment of the executive branch of the
government (involved in public education)
to gain control over certain important functions of the legislative branch. He has

filed one complaint that in pseudo-legalistic
words embraces the breadth of his allegations. When studied in the context of independent paragraphs, it appears to be the
allegations of totally independent and unrelated complaints, but taken as he seems to
intend it, it is a related allegation. He
alleges that the vast majority of the state
public school teachers and many of the
administrators are members of a group
(Utah Education Association) (hereafter
"UEA"). They are alleged to be united in
the promotion of their own interests and in
the shaping of the school system in accordance with their desires. The UEA allegedly secures funds from the group that it
uses to finance the election of favorable
legislative candidates, more particularly,
teachers and administrators. During the
legislative term, the UEA allegedly compensates the group for legislative and personal expenses, even lost wages, if any.
He claims that the UEA makes it possible
for the teacher/legislator to draw UEA
benefits, teachers' salaries, and legislators'
compensation, together with earned retirement benefits under both the teachers'
retirement program and the legislators'
retirement program simultaneously. Furthermore, all these duplicate wages and
benefits continue, not only during the legislative term, but throughout the year, because of committee and legislative hearings. He also alleges that their power in
the legislature far exceeds their number,
because they are a highly organized, unregistered, unrestricted lobby group with
the power to trade votes. They have access to the floor of the legislature, assured
of access to all information in committee
meetings and even in caucuses. The plaintiff alleges that this results in innumerable
laws not possible but for this conspiracy.
He alleges that the schools system is now
primarily supported by funds provided by
the state legislature, as opposed to the
general intent that they be locally controlled by school boards. He alleges that
the taxing system for the support of the
school system results in favored treatment
for certain areas, e.g., that a property owner of a home located in Emery County
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would pay only one-twentieth of the taxes
that a resident in Salt Lake County would
pay for equal ownership in a home. He
further alleges that the legislature has created a textbook commission and empowered the state school superintendent to regulate not only public schools but also private schools, so that the textbooks and
curriculum are controlled throughout the
state in direct conflict with the state constitutional provisions that state that the legislature will not censure school books. He
apparently is also convinced that the UEA
has formed an alliance with church groups
through parent groups, resulting in legislation and the administration of laws to make
property tax-exempt on the basis that it is
worship property or charitable property
when, in fact, it may be used to promote
the evangelistic endeavors of the church
groups, their mutual welfare funds and
their general activities involving church
schools and recreation. He alleges that it
is impossible for a taxpayer to even discover which properties are being treated as
tax-exempt. He alleges that there is no
adequate remedy in the system because it
is extremely unlikely that any member of
the UEA would bring a suit over a dispute
concerning legislative wages or benefits
and even more unlikely that any school
board or school system would do so. He
further alleges that so long as one cannot
identify these tax-exempt properties or determine how they are treated, a general
law suit involving them is not likely to
reach the courts. He seems to be in agreement with the late Martin Luther King,
who attempted to bring about social
change or constitutional rulings by forcing
controversies into court. See Jenkins v.
State, Utah, 585 P.2d 442 (1978); Jenkins
v. Bishop, Utah, 589 P.2d 770 (1980); Jenkins v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289
(1980). As a father of school children and
a taxpayer in Salt Lake County, he presses
for a judicial determination by paying his
taxes under protest.

While the plaintiff seems to welcome judicial action on any portion of these allegations, it would be illogical not to look at his
general overall allegation for whatever
merit it might have. It is noted that the
same general melody of his complaint can
be heard periodically in the news media in
connection with legislative and school
board elections. In view of obvious public
interest in the matter, I would not dismiss
it as a grandiose, paranoic delusion.1 I
would return the case to the trial court
with directions to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine to what extent his allegations may be supported by credible evidence; to hear what public concerns are
present that would indicate jurisdiction
should not be entertained; and to direct the
trial judge to make a discretionary finding
as to whether this plaintiff is entitled to
have the courts entertain jurisdiction on
the basis that he alleges an important public constitutional issue that is not likely to
reach the courts by any other means and
should be determined if the separation of
powers are to be properly maintained.
Such a determination would have to be
made after paying due respect to the constitutional provisions that the legislature
will be the judge of its own election controversies and that broad matters of a political
nature are best determined in the legislative branch of government.

1. It is evident the plaintiff/appellant has taken
instruction from both Jenkins v. State, supra,
and Jenkins v. Bishop, supra. He now aims
directly at the issues, wants an evidentiary hear

mg and tactfully reminds the court that in the
past, individual justices have agreed and others
implied that the issue is one of importance.

STEWART, J., dissents.
HOWE, J., does not participate herein.
WAHLQUIST, District Judge, sat.

